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 I. Introduction: International Arbitration and No-Place law 
 
I should like to begin with a quote: 
Do you dream? When do you dream? What do you dream about? Do you 
dream about international arbitration? Is there a dream for international 
arbitration? Is the concept of delocalised arbitration, or arbitration not 
controlled by national law, a dream or a nightmare?1 
We might think we heard a psychoanalysist speaking. But we would be wrong. In 
fact, the quote comes from an arbitration law practitioner, and not just anyone. The 
speaker was Julian Lew, then the head of arbitration at Herbert Smith, and the 
occasion was the 20th Freshfield Lecture, given in London some five years ago. The 
title of his presentation was this: ‘Achieving the dream – autonomous arbitration’. 
And the dream itself one of the core concerns of international arbitration—to what 
extent it can proceed without interference from states.  
And Lew is far from the only one who dream. In the subsequent year’s Freshfield’s 
lecture, Gabriele Kaufmann-Kohler took up the idea of dreams. Her theme was 
‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?’2 And once you look, you realize: 
the literature on transnational law is replete with dreams, visions, and faith. We 
read about dreams of an adjudicatory system of autonomous arbitration outside the 
control of states.3 We find visions of a lex mercatoria, a commercial law outside the 
                                                        
1 JDM Lew, ‘Achieving the dream: autonomous arbitration’ (2006) 22. Arbitration 
International  179, 179; republished in JDM Lew and LA Mistelis (eds), Arbitration 
Insights: Twenty Years of the Annual Lecture of the School of International Arbitration 
(2007) 455 . Lew makes clear he views this as a dream, not a nightmare. 
2 G Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?’ (2007) 23 
Arbitration International 357. 
3 Lew, above n 1; Kaufmann-Kohler, above n 2 at p 363 n 37; M Martinek, Das 
internationale Kartellrecht 97, cited after the translation in Klaus Peter Berger’, The 
creeping codification of the new lex mercatoria (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International, 
2010) 50 (‘dream of every conflict of laws lawyer, the idea of substantive decisional 
state, created by markets themselves and focused exclusively on the interests and 
expectations of commerce.4 We are exhorted to have faith in a new transnational 
law that helps us transcend state law.5  
Celia Wasserstein Fassberg pointed to the importance of faith earlier:  
For a long time, the existence of lex mercatoria, rather like the existence of 
God, seemed to depend largely on the will to believe. Much early writing on 
the subject was characterised by an ideological, almost mystical zeal. It was 
advocatory rather than descriptive or analytical.6.  
Now, to call the literature on transnational law and especially arbitration as 
ideological and zealous alone is little more than stating the obvious. Much 
scholarship on international commercial arbitration can hardly be distinguished 
from advertising.7 Similarly, it seems hardly novel any longer to point out that this 
zealous advocacy frequently masks a poverty of theoretical foundations. In 
particular, it has long been shown that the idea of an autonomous transnational 
commercial law is not only elusive but also an ideology, a continuation of the long-
                                                                                                                                                                     
harmony that does away with traditional conflict of laws rules, leading to the vision 
of eternal peace that stands behind the idea of the law as such’); C Brower, C Brower 
II and J Sharpe, ‘The coming crisis in the global adjudication system’ (2003) 19 
Arbitration international 424, 436. 
4 Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the new lex mercatoria (2nd ed 
2010) 4 (referring to Schmitthoff). 
5 HJ Berman, ‘World Law,: an ecumenical jurisprudence of the Holy Spirit’  (2004) 
http://cslr.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/media/PDFs/Lectures/Berman_World_Law.p
dfw; see also Dezalay & Garth, eg at p 57, 64. 
6 C Wasserstein Fassberg, ‘Lex mercatoria—hoist with its own petard? (2004) 5 
Chicago Journal of International Law 67, 68. See also HE Hartnell, ‘Living la Vida Lex 
Mercatoria’ (2007) Uniform Law Review 733, 747: “debates over lex mercatoria have 
“religious” overtones, which implies that they are, at least in some cases, rooted in 
belief or ideology, and thus tantamount to tenets of faith.”  G Teubner, ‘Global 
Bukowina: legal pluralism in world society’, in: G Teubner (ed), Global law without a 
state (1997), 3, 7 (‘war of faith’). 
7 R Michaels, Roles and Role Perceptions in International Commercial Arbitration 
(forthcoming). 
refuted ideology of the neat public/private distinction.8 And indeed, even a spurious 
look into the practice of international commercial arbitration and its law reveals 
that it is not autonomous from the state, but instead presents a complex and 
interesting amalgam of state and non-state, public and private law.9 
What is remarkable, however, is how the idea of autonomous transnational law 
continues to permeate the scholarship despite its proven theoretical and empirical 
inadequacy. If truly autonomous law outside the state survides as a trope in the 
literature although it is a known myth, then it is this mythical quality that deserves 
closer attention. What is interesting is not the ideological but the mystical character 
of the zeal. What we may need, therefore is not yet another critique of the idea of  
autonomous non-state law as such, but an analysis of how this idea can survive 
unharmed by the critique. The more obvious reason lies in the economic interests 
that participants in international commercial law have in proclaiming their 
autonomy. The more interesting reason, however, lies in the peculiar, indeed 
“mystical” character of these proclamations. 
This mystical, irrational, character of the scholarship has mostly escaped scrutiny so 
far. And indeed, to most it may look like mere rhetoric, irrelevant for the main 
argument, at best a smoke screen. In this text I argue otherwise. In focusing on 
precisely this mystical angle, I want to ask why faith and dreams and visions are 
such frequent patterns and what that can tell us about transnational law, both its 
potential and its limits. I do not want to poke fun at the proponents of such 
mysticism. Instead, I hope to show that this leap into the irrational is actually 
                                                        
8 For the most extensive critical analysis of lex mercatoria see AC Cutler, Private 
power and global authority: transnational merchant law in the global economy 
(2003). The most extensive study of international commecial arbitration is still Y 
Dezalay & B Garth, Dealing in virtue: international commercial arbitration and the 
construction of a transnational legal order (1998). See also P Zumbansen, Piercing 
the legal veil: commercial arbitration and transnational law’ (2002) 8 European law 
journal 400. 
9 For arbitration, see, eg, CR Drahozal, Private ordering and international 
commercial arbitration’ (2009) 113 Penn State Law Review 1032; for lex 
mercatoria, see R Michaels, The true lex mercatoria: private law beyond the state’ 
(2007) 14 Indiana journal of global legal studies 447. 
characteristic of the situation within which international arbitration finds itself 
today. 
In doing so, I do not aim at drawing an adequate picture of the reality of 
international commercial arbitration, drawing on close analysis of judicial and 
arbitral opinion, statistics, interviews etc. Others have done this very well. Nor am I 
interested even in drawing an accurate and complete picture of the entirety of 
scholarship on international commercial arbitration. That scholarship is enormous; 
it is also quite disparate. Instead, I want to focus specifically on that subpart of the 
literature that proclaims true autonomy of international commercial arbitration. 
And insofar, I am interested less in its content and more in its form, less in its 
accuracy and more in its invocation of dreams, faith, visions, utopias. 10 In other 
words, I suggest analyzing this literature as literature. 
These ideas of autonomous arbitration and law outside the state are ideas of a 
better world: a world governed entirely on the free will of the parties, “free from the 
controls of parochial national laws”11. Arbitration “exists in its own space--a non-
national or transnational or, if you prefer, an international domain. It has its own 
space independent of all national jurisdictions.”12 This would mean that arbitral 
awards are truly delocalized. Or, as the French Cour de Cassation said in its 2007 
Putrabali decision, "an international arbitral award, which is not linked to any 
national legal order, is a decision of international justice.”13 Where national justice, 
with its petty democratic processes and insistence on civil rights, has failed us, 
international justice will at last bring us to the promised land. 
                                                        
10 Cf K Knop, , ‘Utopia without apology: form and imagination in the work of Ronald 
St John Macdonald’ (2002) 40 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 287 (pointing 
out the distinction between utopia as substance and utopia as form). The suggestion 
to distinguish form, substance, and purpose of utopias is explored in Levitas (n ___). 
11 Lew (n 1 above). 
12 Id. 
13 Cour de Cassation, chambre civile, [2007] Revue de l’arbitrage 507 (“Putrabali”), 
praised as a contribution to general legal theory by E Gaillard, ‘La jurisprudence de 
la Cour de cassation en matiére d’arbitrage international’ [2007] Revue de 
l’arbitrage 697, 700. 
Such a completely denationalized law is of course a utopia. But it is a utopia not just 
in the broad sense of being unrealistic, at least for the present, and perhaps also for 
the future. No, it is a utopia in the very literal sense of the word. Recall what utopia 
means in Greek: no place.14 Delocalized arbitration, non-state law, is, literally, no-
place law. It thus make up a utopia in the central meaning of the term.  
This recognition opens up a new avenue towards analyzing the growing literature 
on a transnational law outside of the state. We should, I suggest, read this literature 
as utopian literature. And we should therefore place it alongside other examples 
from the venerable traditions of utopian literature and of dream literature.15 This 
provides us with a new and, as I suggest, promising perspective on the burgeoning 
literature on transnational law. Scholars in the vibrant vield of utopian studies, 
unlike legal scholars, are not content by pointing out that utopias and myths are 
unreal. Instead, they point to the precise funtions that utopias and dreams play, in 
both literature and political argument. They might help us, thus, to move beyond the 
rather fruitless discussion of whether denationalized law is a myth or a reality.16 
Even if it is a myth, a utopia, we may nonetheless find it interesting as such. 
Utopia is both no place (outopia) and good place (eutopia)—a good place that is 
nowhere, an alternative world, desirable but unachievable or at least, as of yet, 
unachieved. Utopia is “a particular quasi-human community where sociopolitical 
                                                        
14 For a helpful discussion of the concept and its changing meaning over time, see F 
Vieira, ‘The concept of utopia’ in G Claeys (ed), The Cambridge companion to 
utopian literature (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010) 3. A more broader 
and analytical approach to the same question is R Levitas, The concept of utopia 
(Hertfordshire: Philip Allan, 1990). 
15 This literature has garned increased interest in recent decades. A handy 
introduction into the debates is LT Sargent, Utopianism—a very short introduction 
(Oxford University Press, 2010). A more extensive history is FE Manuel & FP 
Manuel, Utopian thought in the western world (Belknap Press 1979). See also G 
Claeys, Searching for utopia: the history of an idea (Thames & Hudson 2011). The 
most comprehensive historical analysis of the concept is R Levitas, The concept of 
utopia (1990).  
16 A Kassis, Théorie générale des usages du contrat (Paris 1984) 501ff; George 
Delaume, ‘Comparative analysis as a basis of law in state contracts: The myth of 
the Lex Mercatoria’ (1989) 63 Tulane Law Review 575; see also Cutler (n 8 above) 
54-59 (‘Four liberal myths’). 
institutions, norms and individual relationships are organised according to a more 
perfect principle than in the author’s community, this construction being based on 
estrangement arising out of an alternative historical hypothesis.”17 Utopias are not 
the same as dreams (or visions), but because dreams are avenues to other places, 
the two are frequently related, as in Lyman Tower Sargent’s definition of 
utopianism as “social dreaming—the dreams and nightmares that concern the ways 
in which groups of people arrange their lives and which usually envision a radically 
different society than the one in which the dreamers live.”18 And indeed, so often are 
utopias presented in dreams, so often are dreams literary devices to present 
utopias, that an analysis of utopian literature overlaps with an analysis of dream 
literature. When we speak of dreams, we should also speak of myths, at least if we 
accept John Campbell’s suggestion that "[t]he myth is the public dream and the 
dream is the private myth."19 And we should also speak of faith, because faith is 
what proponents of utopias ask us to have to make these utopias real, to achieve the 
leap from what is now to what should be. 
II. Dream, Vision, Faith, Utopia, Myth as Tropes 
A. The idea and the reality of non-state law 
Invocations of dreams, visions, faith, are, at first sight, surprising. Neither 
international commercial arbitration nor transnational commercial law is your 
usual stuff as dreams are made of. Arbitration is, essentially, nothing more than a 
voluntary dispute resolution mechanism for commercial disputes: parties from 
different countries opt out of the state courts and instead submit their dispute to a 
panel of arbitrators that they designate. It seems to be the clearest example of a law 
                                                        
17 D Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction:On the poetics and history of a a 
literary genre (New Haven: Yale University Press 1979) 49. 
18 LT Sargent, The three faces of utopianism revisited’ (1994) 5 Utopian studies 1, 3. 
19 J Campbell & Bill Moyers, The power of myth (Random House 1991) 48. The 
earliest formulation of this thought was slightly different. See J Campbell, The hero 
with a thousand faces (1949) 19: "Dream is the personalized  myth, myth the  
depersonalized dream." 
devoid of any mythical foundations, based instead entirely in cool economic 
rationality.   
This arbitration has, in reality, never been truly autonomous. States were 
historically quite suspicious of such perceived attempts to “oust” ordinary courts of 
their jurisdiction.20 Today, most states recognize arbitration, but that does not mean 
that states (and their courts) play no role.21 At the beginning of the process, states 
will usually accept a valid arbitration agreement as a barrier to the jurisdiction of 
courts, so no party can escape its obligations under the arbitration agreement. 
During the arbitration, states may be called upon to guarantee the orderly 
proceeding of the arbitral process. At the end of the process, states will freely 
recognize and enforce arbitral awards under an important treaty, the New York 
Convention. Parties may call on state courts to help enforce the arbitration 
agreement, but also to prevent the arbitration or to annul the arbitral award. And 
indeed, the plea for autonomous international arbitration is, at the same, time the 
plea to state courts to enforce the results of this arbitration. 
The situation is similar for a transnational commercial law outside of states, the so-
called new lex mercatoria.22 Here, the frequent story is this: Participants in 
international trade find the substantive law of nation states inadequate for their 
contracts. National law is thought to be parochial and ill-adapted to the 
requirements of the international business community. It is also thought to be 
insufficiently open to party autonomy. Moreover, there are many state laws, so the 
                                                        
20 See the discussion in G Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2 vols 2009). 
There are limits to this recognition however. There are limits for certain types of 
parties – for example consumers – there are  limits for certain types of issues – for 
example certain parts of public law – and there are limits for certain matters of 
public policy – for example arms trade. 
21 JDM Lew, ‘Does national court involvement undermine the international 
arbitration process?’ (2009) 24 American University International Law Review 489, 
492. 
22 From the vast literature, see only KP Berger, The creeping codification of the new 
lex mercatoria (Kluwer International, 2nd ed 2010) with references; J Dalhuisen, 
Dalhuisen on transnational comparative commercial financial and trade law. 
Introduction: The new lex mercatoria and its sources (2010). 
difficult question arises which of them should be applicable. (Existing rules on 
choice of law are typically dismissed as being too complex.) As a consequence, so the 
story continues, market participants create their own laws – through their customs, 
but also through non-state formulating agencies like the International Chamber of 
Commerce. The ensuing law is thus created without state participation, even though 
again states play a crucial role in it: they are asked to recognize lex mercatoria as an 
applicable law. 
But again, the story is untrue. The real lex mercatoria, if we should call the law of 
transnational commerce that, is an amalgam between public and private, state and 
non-state laws and institutions.23 From the perspective of commerce, it is not clear 
why autonomous non-state law would necessarily be preferable to state law. 
Commerce cares little about sources of law per se, and more about effectivity, 
predictability and substantive quality of law. For some issues, non-state law and 
institutions will be preferable, for others, state law and institutions will be chosen. 
B. Dreams 
Stories of autonomus non-state law are, thus, not true – at least in this world. When 
Lew calls such law a dream, this enables him to speak of such law although it does 
not exist in reality. And Lew is not the only scholar to describe arbitration as a 
dream. Here is a quote from another scholar: 
“Reverend Martin Luther King had a history-changing dream, of the end of 
discrimination. Me, I had a dream about a really great conference on 
arbitration, and how it might ultimately help lead to legal reform of 
arbitration.”24 
The link between Martin Luther King and international arbitration may seem far-
fetched, but its invocation is not a single event. Here is another example: 
I  have a  dream that I can  create my own forum  and choose my  own  arbiter 
                                                        
23 See Michaels, above n 9. 
24 JR Sternlight, ‘Dreaming About Arbitration Reform’ (2008) 8 Nevada Law Journal 
1, 1 (internal reference omitted). 
I  have  a dream that a special and wise  expert in  the particular arena of the  
dispute, whom I  trust, can hear my  dispute, and I can accept his or her 
judgment and put the matter behind me,  win  or lose. 
I have a dream that my dispute can be resolved in a private place, so that the 
indignities, dangers, and damages of a public forum do  not compound the  
upset and anger of being in  conflict 
I have a dream that arbitrators are charged with ensuring that their corner of 
the dispute resolution universe  offers a fair and clean playing field. No 
arbitrator will try  to  coerce settlement by  threatening parties with onerous 
outcomes. Every  arbitrator will treat each party with courtesy and respect.25 
Actually, the Reverend King is perhaps not a wholly unlikely hero of delocalized law. 
Recall what he writes in his letter from a Birmingham jail (which is mostly a text on 
legal philosophy and politics) 26 : “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere”27. Opposition to the American state as it existed then led King to 
invocations of a society transcending that state. But what makes Dr.  King’s “I have a 
dream” speech so powerful is not just its substance, but also, perhaps primarily, its 
form. In that speech, Martin Luther King lays out a utopian vision of a world without 
discrimination, presented as a dream. Importantly, this dream reference is powerful 
in large part because of its biblical reference. Recall the many dreams in scripture28 
– from Jacob’s ladder through Joseph’s dream assuring him that his wife’s pregnancy 
                                                        
25 Lela P Love, ‘Images of Justice’ (2001) 1 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Journal 29. 
26 See only D Sturm, ‘Crisis in the American Republic: The legal and political 
significance of Martin Luther King’s Letter from a Birmingham jail (1984) 2 Journal 
of Law and Religion 309. 
27 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, April 16, 1963. The quote 
appears on the website of te American International Commercial Arbitration Court 
(http://court-inter.us/node/88 ) and is used occasionally in arbitration scholarship. 
See, eg, D Ellinghausen Jr, ‘Justice Trumps Peace: the Enduring Relevance of Owen 
Fiss’s Against Settlement’, 
http://pegasus.rutgers.edu/~rcrlj/articlespdf/ellinghausen.pdf;  LE Coutelier, 
‘Annulment and Court Intervention in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2011) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=195727 at 27.  
28 Jean-Marie Husser, Dreams and dream narratives in the Biblical world (1999). 
was not due to adultery – all the way to the Book of Revelations. And recall which 
function they have. Through dreams, God speaks to us. Through dreams we see a 
truth that is otherwise unattainable to us as of now, but a truth that is about to 
come. In this sense, dreams are not less but more true than our everyday reality.29 In 
Russel’s words, “Like the voice of God speaking through the mouths of the prophets, 
the dream motif is a technique for normalizing and exteriorizing—for "realizing" in 
the original sense of that word—the sure and special presence of God.”30 
C. Visionaries 
An arbitrator who dreams thus speaks not of himself but instead of his views of 
another, better, and world. Through dreaming, he becomes a mediator between our 
world and that other world—a medium, connecting the audience with a truth, 
whether God’s or someone else’s. Like a mediator in dispute resolution, who merely 
connects the parties without interfering himself, the arbitration scholar-as-dreamer 
merely connects his audience with the truth of autonomous arbitration, without his 
own intervention. This means that the speaker himself is insignificant; what matters 
is the truth he holds, arising from faith and thus closer contact to God. Here is an 
example from Hildegard of Bingen, the medieval visionary nun:  
I, a poor little form and earthen vessel, speak these things not from myself 
but from the serene light: Man is a vessel which God fashioned for himself, 
which he imbued with his spirit, so that he might accomplish his works in 
him; for God does not work as man does but by the order of his command all 
things are carried out.31 
                                                        
29 Cf JF Priest, Myth and dream in Hebrew Scripture, in J Campbell (ed), Myths, 
Dreams and Religion (New York: EP Dutton and Co 1970) 48, 59-60. 
30 JS Russell, The English Dream Vision—Anatomy of a Form (Columbus OH, Ohio 
State University Press 1988) at 30. 
31 Hildegard of Bingen, Letter to Elisabeth of Schoenau, available at 
http://epistolae.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/letter/125.html. On the rhetoric behind this, 
see, eg BS Rapp, ‘A woman speaks: language and self-representation in Hildegard’s 
letters’ in M Burnett McInerney (ed), Hildegard of Bingen: a book of essays (Taylor & 
Francis 1998) 3, 5; cf. more generally GTW Ahlgren, Visions and rhetorical strategy 
in the letters of Hildegard of Bingen, in K Cherewatuk and U Wiethaus (eds), Dear 
And here is another example expressing the exact same thought, this one from the 
foreword to an Italian treatise on international commercial arbitration: 
If I am right, the best role each of us can play is that of bearer of our beliefs 
and ideals. If this is so, what matters is that these beliefs and ideals continue 
to be carried on, irrespective of who the individual bearer is.32 
The believer is nothing, the belief is everything. But, note the “If I am right” in the 
beginning of the quote. How do we know if a dream is true, if our beliefs and ideals 
are the right ones? Often, in dream literature, not even the dreamer himself 
recognizes the meaning of his own dreams. Gilgamesh dreams of embracing a 
meteorite and an axe, but then he needs his mother to explain the meaning of the 
dream to him. 33 More often, however, the problem is the reverse: the visionary 
knows that he has seen the truth but others will just not believe him. This happens 
in the Bible, and it happens in international arbitration. Jan Paulsson, another 
famous arbitrator and centennial professor at the London School of Economics, 
reports “the terrifying experience of debating Francis Mann,”34 the last staunch 
defender of localized arbitration. 35  Paulsson defended his ow vision of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
sister: medieval women and the epistolary genre (University of Pennsylvania Press 
1993) 46.   
32 M Rubino-Sammartano, International arbitration law and practice (Kluwer Law 
International, 2nd ed 2001)  vii. 
33 A George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and Other Texts in 
Akkadian and Sumerian (London: Penguin Books 2003) 10; Russell (above n ___) 23. 
The classical study remains Al Oppenheim, The Interpretation of Dreams in the 
Ancient Near East , with a translation of an Assyrian Dream Book ((Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Society, Volume 46/3 [1956]; Philadelphia, PA.: 
American Philosophical Society, 1956). See also SA Butler, Mesopotamian 
conceptions of dream and dream rituals (Münster, Ugarit-Verlag, 1998); B Näf, 
Traum und Traumdeutung im Altertum (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2004) 
20-21. A psychological study is K Bulkley, ‘The evil dreams of Gilgamesh: an 
interdisplinary approach to dreams in mythological texts’ in CS Rupprecht (ed), The 
dream and the text: essays on literature and language (SUNY Press 1993) 159. 
34 J Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in three dimensions’, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No 
2/2010, p 33. The passages here cited do not appear in the version later published 
in [2011] 60 International and Commercial Law Quarterly 291. 
35 See FA Mann, Lex facit arbitrum, in P Sanders (ed) International arbitration—liber 
amicorum for Martin Domke (1967) 1957. 
denationalized arbitration but could convince no one, and went home like a 
defeated prophet: “It will take some time for these people to see the light, I thought 
as I dolefully retreated homeward.”36 
Just as Moses needed Aaron to translate and confirm his compact with God to the 
ordinary people, such lonely prophets need others to tell whether the visionary 
speaks the truth, and translate from God’s vessel to the mortals. In theory, that could 
be anybody. In the reality of religion, it is often the church which professes expertise 
and aims at a monopoly on telling us which visions are actually inspired by God and 
which are just madness. In arbitration scholarship, the expertise on arbitration 
visionaries lies with—arbitration practitioners. Here is a prophetic quote from a 
book review: 
When and if a true lex mercatoria, universally-recognized and clearly stated, 
is finally established, visionaries like Carbonneau, who have helped point out 
its advantages and prodded legal and academic institutions toward study and 
action aimed at global legal structures, can take credit for a job well done.37 
When and if indeed. The reviewer is a partner at Jones Day, responsible for 
international arbitration.38 He may thus qualify as an expert about the accuracy of 
visions on arbitration, just like the Catholic Church provides the experts on 
determining the truth value of visions. Of course he may also, dare I say it, be 
someone whose business would benefit if many people believed the vision. But that 
is true for the Catholic church as well: it rarely recognizes visions that run its own 
interests. 
D. Faith 
Note that faith is a necessary requirement here: we recognize God’s word as such in 
dreams and visions only if we believe. Again, we find this trope in the arbitration 
                                                        
36 Paulsson (above n 34) 33. 
37 SC Bennett, Book review (reviewing TE Carbonneau, Lex mercatoria and 
arbitration: a discussion of the new law merchant, Yonkers NY: Juris Publishing, 
rev’d ed 1998), (1999) 10 American Review of International Arbitration 159, 163. 
38 http://www.jonesday.com/scbennett/. 
literature. Emmanuel Gaillard, head of Shearman Sterling’s International Arbitration 
Practice, and chair of the International Arbitration Institute,39 presents, in an 
ambitious theory of international arbitration, three alternative ways of grounding 
international arbitration in the nation state.40 The first is to ground arbitration in 
the state in which the arbitration takes place. The second is to ground it in every 
state in which the ensuing award might be recognized. The third, finally, is to 
ground it in an imaginary community of states. Gaillard neatly demonstrates that 
these different ‘representations’, as he calls them, are in conflict with each other, 
and that this conflict is relevant: they actually yield different results on important 
doctrinal questions. Among these are the questions whether an international 
arbitral award can be recognized even if it has been annulled by a court in the place 
of the arbitration, or whether an arbitrator has to comply with an antisuit injunction 
rendered by a court. 
So one would expect that Gaillard, after discussing these different representations, 
would tell us which of them is the most convincing. Instead of such a choice, we find 
a remarkable leap: 
what is at stake are not matters that may be disposed of by scientific 
demonstration, but rather matters that belong to the realm of belief, of faith. 
There is no such thing as a right or wrong representation of international 
arbitration. As for every other vision or ideology, one may share it or not. It 
may be efficient or inefficient, but never right or wrong. 
This is quite remarkable. After all, faith is used here to establish nothing less than 
the very foundations of the whole theory—the autonomy of arbitration. Precisely at 
the point, when arbitration must be legitimized (and therefore at precisely the point 
at which philosophy of law should furnish answers), we find, instead of an 
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argument, a genuinely Kierkegaardian leap from rationality to faith. 41  The 
legitimacy of arbitration itself, and thus the core of its identity, cannot be accessed 
by reason alone.  What is achieved is thus not ultimate justification, but instead the 
formulation of a credo, on which the epistemic community is based and which holds 
it together. The community of delocalized law, it appears, is a community of faith. 
It seems there is, in such approaches, no way to the promised land through pure 
reason alone. Julian Lew’s dream of an autonomous arbitration, in order to become 
real, must remain a dream, grounded in faith. We will not have its hard reality 
unless we believe in it, and act accordingly. In the words of AT Jones’ lesson on faith 
from 1898: ‘The word of God is self-fulfilling, and to trust it and depend upon it as 
such, that is to exercise faith.’42  In a remarkably similar sense, Basil Markesinis 
quotes from Count Zeppelin’s tombstone in Constance, for a transnational law: ‘First 
you dream; then you believe in your dream, and then it happens!’43 The use of the 
quote is of course puzzling— the airship Zeppelin pioneered went up in flames in 
1937, on arrival in New York.44 But the quote itself is maybe even more puzzling in 
its open antirationality: the path from dreaming through believing to happening is a 
direct one; it eshews rational argument and needs no rational justification. 
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thinking of Anatole France’s speech on the construction of the Suez Canal: ‘pour 
accomplir de grandes choses il ne suffit pas d’agir, il faut rêver, il ne suffit pas de 
calculer, il faut croire.’ Séance de l'Académie française du 24 décembre 1896. Discours 
de réception de Anatole France (Paris 1897) 21. 
E. Utopia 
These dreams are thus paths to another world that is more true and more perfect – 
a utopia. My earlier quote’s reference to the time “when and if a true lex mercatoria 
is finally established”45 is a reminder that utopias are not always about other places, 
they are also about other times. In most cases, those other times are the future.46 
Autonomous arbitration may be nowhere, but it is also always “yet to come”. It 
shares this look into the future with another utopia, socialism.47 In Edward 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward, published in 1889, a young hero falls asleep after a 
socialist meeting – after, not during – and wakes up 113 years later, in 2000, in a 
Boston that displays considerably more socialism than just universal health care.48 
Everyone retires with full benefits at age 45, and may eat in any of the public 
kitchens. All means of production are owned by the state; all goods are equally 
distributed to its citizens. Private litigation has ceased (here the socialist dream 
differs from the arbitration dream), as has most crime; what crime remains is 
treated as a medical condition.  
And sometimes, utopia is not in the future but in the past: not the promised land 
where the better among us may hope to live for eternity, but the garden of Eden 
from which we have been driven – or, more frequently yet, the Middle Ages, 
idealized in the nineteenth century by Sir Walter Scott and others.49 William Morris, 
writing a short while after Bellamy, also describes a dream of a socialist utopia, but 
his dream vision, entitled “News from Nowhere” goes not to the future but to the 
past, an imagined idealized middle ages with no private property, no big cities, no 
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authority, no monetary system, no divorce, no courts, no prisons, and no class 
systems.50 Authors like Scott and Morris  are not interested in the Middle Ages as 
they really were. They use the Middle Ages as a counter-image to their own time. We 
speak in this context of medievalism—or, to describe the newly found love for the 
Middle Ages in more recent times, of neo-medievalism.51 
Such medievalism exists in law as well, especially with regard to non-state law.52 
The Middle Ages are attractive because they appear to represent a model of 
governance that predates the modern State—and can therefore help to transcend 
it.53 Scholars romanticize, for example, arbitration in medieval Iceland.54 However, 
the most prominent equivalent to the romance of the middle ages in literature is 
found in the romance of the lex mercatoria (in fact, the title of an influential book)55. 
This is at the same time the purest example of what may be called legal 
medievalism. I quote from Julian Lew’s own romance of this paradise lost, but one 
could quote countless other authors instead:56 
In [the middle ages], the regulation of arbitration by national law was 
nonexistent or minimal. The business community was left free to structure 
and use an arbitration system it considered suitable for its needs. The early 
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forms of arbitration often existed without the blessings of, and perhaps 
oblivious to, the judicial mechanisms and national laws of the sovereign 
states in which they operated and which may have been relevant. In fact, at 
that time arbitration was crafted specifically to facilitate the dispute 
resolution needs of a particular industry or a community. There was no need 
or desire to imitate the procedures of any judiciary; that was often precisely 
what the industries sought to avoid. 
To determine these disputes, arbitrators applied relevant established 
custom, created out of the merchants' own needs and views, as the legal rules 
and standards according to which rights and obligations of the parties were 
determined, often shunning the legal technicalities and substance of local 
law. This was an international commercial law applicable to these 
international transactions--the lex mercatoria  of those times.57 
Now, literally none of this is historically true.58 Adjudicatory processes in the middle 
ages were exclusively local and mostly run by official entities. Arbitration existed, 
but arbitrators were often not merchants of the trade of the parties, and what was 
expected from them was often adjudication based not on commercial needs but 
instead on love and empathy.59  Sometimes the processes were indeed catered to 
the special needs of a certain industry, sometimes not. Further, an international 
commercial law, a substantive lex mercatoria outside the state, never existed. All 
that we find are special procedural mechanisms, but hardly any significant unified 
non-state law. In a time when it took weeks to travel from one fair to another, it is 
hard to see how such a law on a universal basis could have developed.  
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The interesting aspect is not, however, that scholars proposing a new law merchant 
get the history wrong, but that they care about this history at all.60 Indeed, the 
history is of interest to them, but this interest is quite different from the interest of  
historians, and therefore the findings of historians have only limited value for the 
project of lex mercatoria scholars. Historians aim at describing the actual Middle 
Ages to show how things actually were in the past. Arbitration scholars aim at 
invoking utopias of an imagined middle ages to show how things actually could and 
should be in the present. In looking back, the alleged medieval lex mercatoria 
becomes, in Nicholas Foster’s word, a foundation myth.61 In serving as a model, it 
becomes a utopia. And utopias cannot be falsified; after all, it is their main 
characteristic that they are not true in this world. 
III. Four criticisms 
What follows? Does it matter if this literature is utopian? I want to suggest four 
critical responses62—three that strike me as ultimately unhelpful, and one that is 
actually powerful.. 
A. Sugar-Coating 
A first response would be that the dream framework is a mere rhetorical trick to 
deceive opponents, to make palatable to them through the use of imagery what 
they would oppose if it were presented as hard facts. Perhaps one could say about 
Julian Lew’s utopia of an unrestrained arbitration what a contemporary reviewer 
said about Bellamy’s utopia of a socialist future, calling it a text “which in the 
sugar-coated form of a dream has exhibited a dose of undiluted socialism, which has 
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been gulped by some of the most vigilant opponents of that theory without a 
suspicion of the poison they were taking into their system.”63 The myth of a fully 
denationalized and autonomous private arbitral system, one may say, serves only to 
conceal the reality in which public state institutions are instrumentalized for private 
interests. It tries to make palatable a tension shown already byDezalay and Garth’s 
sociological study pointed out long ago: International commercial arbitration is not 
merely a neutral and disinterested mechanism of dispute resolution; it is also big 
business.64 Or, even more prosaically, arbitrators may need to rekindle the faith in 
international arbitration, because that is how they make their money. At least one 
quote from a practitioner lays out quite clearly the terrible consequences that would 
emerge from a lack of such faith. That they rely on such faith is openly admitted: 
“[T]here seems to be a belief that international arbitration is facing a crisis of 
confidence that could jeopardise its pre-eminent status. That belief is a cause 
of concern for the individuals, firms, organisations and localities that have 
economic interests in the success and continued growth of arbitration, 
including lawyers, arbitrators, arbitration associations and administrative 
bodies and localities that have or hope to become major centres for 
arbitration proceedings. After all, international arbitration has become a big 
business (relatively speaking.)”  
But the very existence of the quote (and others like it) proves that this explanation 
is not sufficient. It is probably correct that the arbitration practitioner-as-dreamer 
would benefit if his dream were to come true.  But sugar-coating is present in all 
advertisements, and as I suggested earlier, most arbitration scholarship is also 
advertising.65 More importantly, scholars writing about dreams of autonomous law 
do not, by and large, conceal this  advertising aspect. In other words, the criticism 
does not go far enough: it explains why transnational law is presented in a favorable 
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light, but it does not explain the particular form of dreams, visions, and utopia in 
which this sugar-coating comes. 
B. Escapism 
Here, then, is a second possible critique of utopian literature and of dream 
literature: Utopianism avoids reality and instead depicts alternative universes. If I 
mentioned utopian socialism as one example, it is worth recalling the anti-utopian 
strand in socialism, going back to Engels’ and Marx’s criticism of early utopian 
socialists like Fourier, Owen, and Saint-Simon.66 The criticism of escapism has been 
made repeatedly also against transnational law, especially in the form of lex 
mercatoria. Klaus Peter Berger, himself a proponent of a lex mercatoria outside the 
state, reports on such criticism made against autonomous transnational law. 
Remarkably, he suggests that dream and utopia are mostly tropes not of supporters 
but of critics: “opponents … attack the [new lex mercatoria] … as legal utopia, a 
useful illusion or legal dreams of the future, as wishful thinking, and as a disguise for 
the marketing of own solution.”67 And he defends lex mercatoria by denying its 
utopian character:  
“In this age of private governance and legal pluralism, the [new lex 
mercatoria] is not a myth or dream of the future. Today, transnational 
commercial law, the New Lex Mercatoria, is a fact of life.68 
This is more an assertion than an argument.69 But I also do not think that the 
utopian character of utopias as such is the problem. After all, utopias are mostly not 
about other places but about ours, not about other times but about our own. 
Bellamy’s dream of the future is not called “Looking Forward” but “Looking Back,” 
and it turns out that the people in his imagined Boston of the future have more to 
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say about Bellamy’s own time than about their own. In the end Bellamy cares less 
about the beautiful reality of the future than about the capitalist nightmare of his 
own present.70 The same is true for proponents of transnational law, as Nikitas 
Hatzimihail has rightly said: ‘what matters, for the debate, is not so much what 
actually happened, but what projections into the past align best with present 
circumstances and what constructions of the past are used to justify explanations of 
the present.’71 
Look at how dreams are used in literature. Dreams are presented not as irrational 
other worlds but critiques of, and or models for, our own world. When Cicero, 
towards the end of his Republic, describes a dream of Scipio – the dream that 
becomes the most important model for the dream literature of medieval England72 – 
this dream is little more than a replication of the conservative image of the state he 
has laid out before. 73 A dreamer who stays in his dreams—Bunyan’s pilgrim is a 
(rare) example—could be called escapist. Otherwise, in almost all dream literature, 
we find a different pattern:74 the dreamer falls asleep in a situation of great distress 
over the troubles of our own world, he is then transported into another space or 
time that he finds to be perfect, and finally, and crucially, he awakes in the here and 
now, relieved of his former troubles, and ready to tell us others about the dream.  
Examples exist in arbitration literature, too. “News and Views,” the regular 
publication of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, published, in a 1998 issue, a so-
                                                        
70 Or even beyond, that of a lost past. See M Cantor, ‘The backward look of Bellamy’s 
Socialism’ in D Patai, Looking Backward, 1988-1888: Essays on Edward Bellamy 
(University of Massachussetts Press 1988) 3. 
71 NE Hatzimihail, ‘The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as 
Genealogy in International Business Law’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 169, 173. 
72 K Lochrie,’ Sheer Wonder: Dreaming Utopia in the Middle Ages’ (2006) 36 Journal 
of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 493-516 
73 Russell (above n ) 7-10. 
74 Russell (above n) 5-6. 
called “Report of Fact-Finding Visit to Utopia.” 75 In this report, the countryUtopia 
had an arbitration act that looks almost exactly like the 1996 UK Act. There was only 
one difference: “In the Utopian version, all of the arbitrator’s powers are mandatory 
and subject to the unfettered discretion of the arbitrator, the parties cannot by 
agreement increase or limit the power of the arbitrator.” As a consequence of this 
difference, everything works fine in Utopia. The report ends with the usual return to 
the miseries of our world: “After such an enlightening experience, it was so 
disappointing to return to England and find that nothing had really changed and our 
process still felt as though we were wading through treacle.” 
In fact, the proposal of a better alternative world that permeates all utopian 
literature always comes first and foremost as a critique of our own world. Neither 
Plato nor Thomas More are interested in alternative universes. They use dream and 
utopia in order to critique the world of their time. In the case of autonomous 
arbitration, this critique is directed against the national character of law and the 
positivism of its sources. National commercial law is said to be inconsistent with the 
requirements of a global economy. Positivism with its limited view of law as 
emerging from a sovereign is said to be insufficient for a world in which much law is 
made by non-state actors: legal practitioners, arbitral panels, but also so-called 
formulating agencies76 like the International Chamber of Commerce and the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association. The dream of autonomous 
arbitration speaks less to the other world – that of arbitrators – and more to ours – 
that of state courts and judges. After all, state courts are asked to enforce arbitration 
agreements, even in the face of antisuit injunctions. State courts are asked to enforce 
arbitral awards, even if these awards have been annulled in their home country. 
Arbitrations non-place law becomes anything but that: it is presented as a reality to 
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be accepted by us, in our place. Utopia provides ideas about other worlds, but the 
solutions it suggests are solutions for ours. 
C. Anti-rationalism 
This gives way to a third criticism: if utopian literature is about our world rather 
than another, why should we have to rely on dreams, faith, vision, to embrace it? 
Autonomous arbitration, non-state laws, are quite radical ideas. Should we not 
demand that they be justified by reason and empirics instead of dreams and faith? 
Do we not deserve concrete reform proposals that can be discussed and, if needs be, 
rejected, instead of lofty imaginations? Is not ours a time, maybe the first one, that 
does not require myth and dreams to propose a better future?77  
The answer is not as clear-cut as we may think at first. Consider this: our current 
paradigm of law, that of national positivism, the paradigm that transnational law 
tries to overcome, is also built, ultimately, on faith.78 Take the rule of recognition – 
H.L.A. Hart’s suggestion that the normative bindingness of positive law rests on the 
socially observable fact that people in fact recognize the rulemaking power of the 
sovereign.79 Not only is this recognition itself, quite possibly, a myth80 (just as 
Kelsen’s grundnorm is a fiction). What other ground exists for this recognition than 
the people’s faith in the lawmaking authority of the sovereign? In legal positivism, 
the basis of all law lies in the sovereign state. But the state itself is a myth, as 
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Cassirer reminds us,81 and sovereignty as a legal concept rests not on the actual 
force of the sovereign but instead on our mutual faith in it.82  
Historically, legal positivism did not prevail over the earlier paradigm of natural law 
because it was more rational, or less reliant on faith than natural law. Instead, legal 
positivism prevailed because, in its time, the faith it required was more convincing 
than the earlier faith. Natural law had presumed a certain unity – a unity of religion 
where law was based in God’s will, a unity of reason where law was based in reason. 
When this unity became questionable in times of religious pluralism, legal 
positivism became a response to the crisis of that unity. Now that a transcendent 
truth could no longer be found outside society, it had to be sought either in the will 
of a ruler, or within the compromises that society was able to make through the 
political process.83 
Now, in the same way in which legal positivism reacted to a crisis of natural law, the 
literature on transnational law can be viewed as a sign for the crisis that legal 
positivism is suffering today.84 That crisis of legal positivism comes from two 
connected developments. The first development is globalization – the transcendence 
of national boundaries in commerce and communication.85 The second development 
is privatization – the growing importance of norms formulated and enforced by non-
state entities.86 And globalization and privatization, taken together, arguably call for 
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a global private law – autonomous arbitration, and a new lex mercatoria. If the faith 
in sovereignty no longer holds, a new faith must be developed. We may thus criticize 
the particular faith that is being asked from us by the proponents of lex mercatoria. 
But in view of the development of law up until today, it seems exaggerated to 
criticize these proponents for propagating faith at all. 
In a sense, the criticism has it exactly backwards. It suggests that crisis is no time for 
utopia; it requires rationality. If we look back at history we find the opposite: dream 
and myth are especially prominent, and perhaps especially important, in times of 
crisis.87 When a paradigm shift is needed, it is necessary to try and think outside the 
current paradigim, and that means: to move, deliberately or not, to that which is not 
(yet). As Paul Tillich suggests, “Utopia opens up possibilities which would have 
remained lost if not seen by utopian anticipation.”88 In this sense, Niki Lacey has 
praised utopian thought as an avenue for feminist legal scholars,89 and international 
lawyers like Philipp Allott, Ronald Macdonald and Antonio Cassese have drafted 
explicitly utopian worldviews.90 When Martti Koskenniemi places international law 
argument between apology and utopia,91 his critique of both positions is neither 
blind to the impossibility to avoid both, nor particularly unsympathetic to the 
utopian project of international law. 
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After all, rationality may be merely the particular thought pattern of the status quo. 
Karl Mannheim has suggested a rather simple but helpful distinction between 
ideology, which is objectionable, and utopia, which is desirable. Ideology is, for 
Mannheim, the thought system of the status quo—in principle conservative, 
anathema to change, suppressive. Utopia, by contrast, is the thought system of the 
marginalized—an escape from such suppression of thought, the path to change and 
a better life.92 This is not unproblematic, not least because it does not sufficiently 
account for how utopias can become ideologies once they are put into practice. (It is 
also doubtful, applied to international arbitration, whether the arbitration 
community can really claim the role of the suppressed.) But it suggests that utopia 
may, at least, for a certain period, be the only way to overcome the constraints of the 
present. 
D. Totalitarianism 
If, as in Mannheim’s distinction, utopia may change into ideology, then once utopia 
is realized, it is no longer a liberator from oppression; it may itself become the 
oppressor. Ernst Bloch’s suggestion that utopia is antitotalitarian—a means, 
perhaps the only one available, for the suppressed to overcome, if only (at first) in 
dreaming, the constraints of the world in which they live—then this applies only to 
unfulfilled utopia.93 This suggests that the real problem with the utopia of 
delocalized arbitration lies in a fourth criticism. The most powerful criticism of 
utopia is not that it is unreal, but that its proposed reality, taken seriously, is 
actually frightening. It can “have a charm of its own as long as it is a dream, but 
turns into a fool’s paradise as soon as it is realized.”94  Many utopias present us with 
perfectionist and therefore static images of the world: they are not open to 
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improvement and development.95 We read with some pleasure about utopias; we 
would rarely want to live in them. 
So this is utopia, is it? Well- 
I beg your pardon; I thought it was hell.96 
 
Recall the criticism Sir Karl Raimund Popper voiced against Plato, Hegel and Marx.97 
He took them to task not just for the utopian character of their visions of the world, 
but for the totalitarian aspect in them, which he viewed as anathema to an open 
society. More recently, this argument from political philosophy has received a 
sociological bent: Runciman argues that Plato, Hobbes and Marx have insufficient 
understanding of the production of order in society: they think it can be brought 
about only through a despot. 98  Indeed, as Rouvillois argues, utopia and 
totalitarianism are interconnected: 
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have reached perfection: there is no need for novelty or change; no one can 
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between politics and utopia’ in T Moylan and R Baccolini (eds) Utopia method vision 
(Peter Lang 2007) 25. 
98 WG Runciman, Great books, bad arguments: “Republic”, “Leviathan”, and the 
“Communist Manifesto” (Princteon University Press 2010). See already R 
On the one hand, the most blatant utopias with their obsession to rehabilitate 
man and condemn him to happiness do indeed reveal traits that we 
habitually attribute to totalitarian systems. On the other hand, totalitarian 
systems – Fascism, Nazism, Stalinism or Chinese Socialism – even when they 
don’t acknowledge the connection, invariably remind us of utopias, whose 
goals, mottoes, and means they appropriate. 99 
Proponents of autonomous international arbitration will reject such criticism as 
inapplicable to international arbitration and lex mercatoria. Autonomous 
arbitration and self-made law, so they may argue, are the exact opposites of 
totalitarianism, because they rest entirely on freedom, here expressed as party 
autonomy.100 After all, their whole raison d’être is to avoid the totalitarianism 
inherent in the state’s monopoly on adjudication and law production. Autonomous 
arbitration does not require a despot to be brought about; it represents the absence 
of all despotism. 
And yet, at closer look, the dream of autonomous arbitration does reveal its own 
totalitarian potential. A world in which everything is ultimately grounded in 
individual consent would be a world in which nothing other than individual consent 
matters. It is a place without love or hope, a place without sympathy or other 
feelings. It is a place of individuals, not of community. It is a world that has no actual 
freedom, because it confines freedom to party autonomy. And, notably, it is a place 
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from which politics is absent. It is a place in which everything has been subjected to 
the totalitarianism of economic reasoning. 101 
The reality of international arbitration is not—of course—such a place. Although 
many still try to base everything that goes on on the parties’ consent, this often 
becomes more and more of a fiction—as in the example that the application of 
mandatory rules against the content of a contract is somehow desired by the parties. 
Empathy does play a role and is sometimes praised.102 There exists a transnational 
epistemic community of international arbitration that transcends individuals 
(though it excludes many others). And, of course, politics matters, although it is 
disputed to what degree and in what way. This idealized world, in other words, is 
not realistic. In our real world, we will continue to see the fruitful tensions between 
market claims for autonomy and state claims for political control, between 
economic rationalities that become increasingly globalized and democratic 
processes that remain, for the time being, in the realm of states. 
But, perhaps more importantly, such an idealized world is also not desirable. The 
crisis of legal positivism has made democratic control of law harder, but it has not 
shattered our belief – our faith, if you will – that such democratic control of law 
remains necessary. It is not only states that would fear an autonomous arbitration. It 
is us, the society of the world that wants to remain able to limit this autonomy 
where core issues of justice and democracy are at stake. And, perhaps, even the 
community of international commercial arbitration would not really want such a 
development. The dream of autonomous arbitration is presented as a dream not 
only because that is the form in which utopias frequently exist, or because it 
expresses something that is not yet real. It is also presented as a dream because this 
form enables it to remain a thought experiment, without real world implications. 
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Now, such totalitarianism, or perfectionism, is not intrinsic to all utopian thought. 
Russell Jacoby distinguishes, helpfully, between blueprint utopias (that are 
oppressive) and iconoclastic utopias that refuse to draw a future in details, that 
instead allow for creativity and freedom. 103 In a parallel line, Lyman Tower Sargent 
suggests that utopias may be of limited value as blueprints for actual political or 
sociological projects, even if they can be defended as literature.104 In other words, 
arbitration scholarship could actually be exciting, liberating, utopia—if indeed it laid 
out dreams and visions, not meticulous details. But alas, as literature, most 
arbitration scholarship is a huge disappointment. To return yet once more to Julian 
Lew’s article, the talk of dream and nightmare is over fairly soon. What follows is a 
detailed technical discussion of doctrinal details. The same can be said of most other 
texts. These texts do mention dreams and visions, and thus aim to partake in the 
utopian project, but in the end, they remain uncreative and technical, technocratic 
instead of liberating. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
If I am right, then, the ain problem with Lew’s “Achieving the dream” – is not in the 
dream; it is in the achieving. The dream, the idea, could be interesting, provocative, 
exciting, thought-provoking, paradigm-shifting, helpful. (It is also, I think, ill-
conceived and potentially dangerous, but that is not my topic here.)105 Turned into a 
proposal for reality, however, the dream suddenly looks not only woefully 
incomplete, but also positively scary.    
Let me quote once more Celia Wasserstein Fassberg: 
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In this [utopian] mode, a historical model only needs to offer ideal 
characteristics of the phenomenon that is advocated. It does not need to be 
more than an idea.106 
I agree and would just like to sharpen the last point. Not only does the model not 
need to be more than an idea; it also should not be be more than an idea.  Our world 
is infinitely more complex than the sterile dreams and utopias presented in the 
literature. International commercial arbitration as an imagined purely private 
institution is embedded within society with all its conflicts and demands, and 
necessarily interacts with that society. Arbitration has unavoidable spillover effects 
on the rest of society: it affects the distribution of assets and resources, it affects the 
rights of employees and consumers, it reduces or enhances the power of 
monopolists, it reduces or enhances environmental injuries, and so on and so forth. 
Society, in turn, will continue to make demands on international commercial 
arbitration, to hold it responsible, to deny it full autonomy. Compared to this, 
utopian dreams of an autonomous law outside of such demands could be exciting 
and thought-provoking, utopian or dystopian. 
In the end, then, I suggest we should not criticize the arbitration literature for its use 
of utopia, dream, and myth. We would be better off if we had more, not fewer, of 
such utopias and myths. We would be better off with more visions, more creativity, 
more actual radicalism in arbitration scholarship. Where existing scholarship goes 
beyond the analysis of detailed doctrines, it gives a hint of how exciting it could 
actually be. But unfortunately, this is usually no more than a hint. If, as I have tried 
to show, it can be understood as utopian literature, then it is also disappointing 
utopian literature. Too often, the tropes of dreams and visions are used as mere 
introductory devices, as steps to overcome a weakness in the argument instead of 
actual bridges to liberation and creativity. Compared to such shallow dreams, we 
should prefer to be awake. 
                                                        
106 Wasserstein Fassberg (note 6 above) at 68. 
